In Do v. Jean Carlo (MD Fla.), Doe sued “alleged violations of the federal Trafficking Victims’ Protection Reauthorization Act (‘TVPRA’), violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (‘FLSA’), breach of contract” and related theories. The complaint alleges that:
Dr. Jean-Charles targeted desperate and vulnerable immigrant medical graduates (“IMGs”), lured them to work for JC Medical Center with the promise of compensation, experience, and a letter of recommendation to help them “ match” a residency program. withheld payment or underpaid these vulnerable IMGs [including Doe]and forced them to work full time seeing dozens of patients.
But yesterday’s decision by Judge Robert Norway (M.D. Fla.) concludes that Doe had to sue in his own name:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires that “each pleading” in federal court “name all parties.” This rule “protects the public’s legitimate interest in knowing all the facts involved, including the identity of the parties.” … A party may proceed anonymously or pseudonymously by establishing “a substantive right to privacy that overcomes the ‘presumption of openness customary and constitutionally incorporated in judicial proceedings.'” … The Eleventh Circuit held that the “first step ” [in this analysis] is to consider the three factors analyzed in Southern Methodist University Law Student Women’s Association v. Wynne & Jaffe (5th Cir. 1979): “if the party requesting anonymity (1) is challenging the government’s business; (2) would be forced, in the absence of anonymity, to disclose highly sensitive information; or (3) would be forced, in the absence of anonymity, to admit an intention to engage in illegal conduct and therefore risk criminal prosecution.”
Together with the SMU factors, the court should “carefully examine all the circumstances of a given case and then decide whether the customary practice of disclosing the plaintiff’s identity should yield to the plaintiff’s privacy concerns.” For example, the court may also consider “whether the plaintiffs were minors, whether they were threatened with violence or physical harm by prosecuting in their own names, and whether their anonymity constituted a unique threat of fundamental injustice to the defendant.” …
Starting from the first step of considering the SMU factors, the plaintiff relies on the third factor, that he would be forced to admit an intent to engage in unlawful conduct and risk criminal prosecution as his substantial privacy interest. The plaintiff alleges that he may have violated sections 456.065 and 817.234 of the Florida Statutes, which make it a crime under certain circumstances to practice medicine without a license and to engage in insurance fraud. But the plaintiff did not cite any case law supporting his position or provide information indicating any pending criminal cases or allegations of impending charges. Without further information, the Court cannot find that the plaintiff has established a substantive right to privacy that outweighs the presumption of open judicial proceedings. See Doe v. Florida Gulf Coast Univ. Bd. of Trustees (MD Fla. 2023) (denying motion to proceed anonymously where complainant did not state that criminal charges were imminent or indicate pending criminal proceedings).
Furthermore, the plaintiff does not contest the Florida statutes he believes he violated: the potential criminal conduct alleged here is peripheral to the case. Courts have held that the person being forced to admit an intent to engage in illegal conduct is a factor in plaintiffs’ favor where plaintiffs challenge the validity of the law they have violated or intend to violate. The Court therefore holds that the third SMU the factor does not weigh in favor of the plaintiff….
The plaintiff claims that proceeding under his name will cause him great embarrassment and humiliation because he is an alleged victim of labor trafficking and that he fears retaliation from the defendant in the form of reputational damage. But Plaintiff once again fails to provide any case law to support his position that his circumstances establish a substantive right to privacy. Plaintiff simply offers a more concrete picture of Defendant’s alleged wrongdoing and how he believes Defendant will defame his reputation in the medical community because this action will expose him. While the Court is sympathetic to the plaintiff’s situation and concerns, the fear of embarrassment, humiliation, and retaliation is not enough to outweigh the interest in prosecuting publicly…. “…'[P]”Personal embarrassment” alone is not enough to proceed anonymously.”…
In summary, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a substantive right to privacy that overcomes the presumption of judicial openness. The Court understands that the plaintiff has alleged unfortunate circumstances and reasonable fears, but the Court finds that this issue does not arise the type of exceptional case necessary to proceed under a pseudonym.… “Lawsuits are public events. The plaintiff should be permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the damage complained of would immediately result from the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity.”…