Social anarchism and rejection of moral tyrannyby Jesse Spafford, Cambridge University Press, 242 pages, $110
What do anarchists argue? It depends on who you ask. Among free-market libertarians, anarchists typically share a vision in which private companies, competing in the market, replace security services traditionally monopolized by the state. But most self-described anarchists espouse a very different vision in which private property is seen as an instrument of oppression analogous to the state. For social anarchists, community cooperation and egalitarian sharing should (largely or entirely) replace market competition and private participation.
Social anarchism has had relatively few defenders within the analytical tradition of academic philosophy. Jesse Spafford, a lecturer at Victoria University of Wellington, aims to fill this gap Social anarchism and rejection of moral tyranny. Spafford seeks to demonstrate that the conclusions of social anarchy can be drawn from premises that libertarians have reason to find attractive.
Spafford’s arguments are more complex than a brief review can do justice to, but here is an unfortunately oversimplified sketch of some of his main lines of argument.
Spafford grounds his case for social anarchism in what he says is a “recurring theme in libertarian thought”, namely that “people should not be allowed to discretionally impose costs on others”. In Spafford’s hands, this commitment becomes a “constraint of moral tyranny” that prohibits anyone from “acting unilaterally, discretionally, and predictably in a way that would leave others with less advantage than they would have had if the agent had done some other choice”.
From this foundation, Spafford draws some conclusions that are likely to be congenial to free-market libertarians, such as self-ownership and a consensus theory of state legitimacy (specifying that the mere fact that the state has issued a decree does not, in and of itself, mean himself, himself, give anyone a reason to obey the decree unless he has consented to the authority of the State). But he also draws a conclusion that libertarians will find less palatable, to put it mildly: that self-owners cannot legitimately own anything. other of themselves.
This conclusion will likely seem radical even among social anarchists, many of whom seek to target private ownership of the means of production (e.g., land, capital goods) or commodities for market exchange, making an exception for personal property (for example, the proverbial toothbrush). Spafford allows no such exceptions.
Spafford’s ban on outside property begins deceptively modestly, with the defense of the famous “Lockean clause” advanced in John Locke’s treatise. Second Government Treaty, which requires that those who appropriate resources for their own use do so in a way that does not make others worse off. Spafford’s argument for the clause is that it follows directly from the constraint of moral tyranny: if my acts of appropriation leave you worse off, then I have imposed a cost on you without your consent.
Those libertarian theorists who accept the clause, such as Robert Nozick and David Schmidtz, think that it is quite easy to satisfy, given the greater opportunities that a privately owned society offers to everyone, whether they are among the first appropriations or not. But Spafford argues that the clause actually bars any exclusive appropriation. Although the ways in which private appropriations are likely using one’s own resources (given market incentives) are, in general, advantageous for others, for the simple fact that they I could using those resources in ways that would harm the interests of others is a moral cost to others, just like being a slave owner I could Freely deciding to beat or kill his slaves is a moral cost to those slaves, even if the slave owner is not so inclined to cruelty. Being subject to the arbitrary will of another is incompatible with freedom, regardless of how that will may be exercised. Spafford therefore rejects private property for the same reasons that he rejects state authority.
Spafford’s argumentative skills are impressive, but that doesn’t mean his case is convincing. In particular, his fundamental principle, the constraint of moral tyranny, seems too strong. Libertarians have traditionally distinguished between different ways of imposing costs on others, with some ways – those involving “aggression” (however defined) – subject to much stricter prohibitions than others. I think Spafford is right that those who find it problematic to impose costs on others via aggression should also find it problematic to impose costs on others via non-aggressive means; but I think he is too quick to assume that they should find it equally problematic, authorizing bans of equal severity.
The fact that an action imposes an uncompensated disadvantage on others, even nonaggressively, is plausibly a prima facie argument against its moral permissibility. But the distance from a prima facie case to an all things considered case, let alone a legitimacy case, is long. by force prevent such imposition.
To cross that distance, there would need to be no compensatory considerations. Spafford argues that pragmatic considerations cannot be legitimate objections if they are grounded in utilitarianism, since utilitarianism – as both John Rawls and Robert Nozick have argued – treats benefits to some people as if they could offset costs to other people . But not all pragmatic considerations need presuppose the truth of utilitarianism. If, as most economists agree, the abolition of private property would dramatically lower a society’s standard of living (for family informational and incentive reasons), then such abolition would itself appear to conflict with the constraint of moral tyranny imposing uncompensated costs on almost everyone. And if the constraint both imposes and prohibits the abolition of private property, then it would seem to be a failing principle.
Even leaving aside such economic considerations, Spafford’s extreme version of the Moral Tyranny Constraint seems to go against the spirit of that constraint. Some degree of discretionary imposition of costs on others is surely a necessary part of the context of ordinary life. To give an example that Spafford himself talks about, let’s suppose that the person I am in love with chooses my rival over me, thus worsening my situation without my consent. This choice is permissible, according to Spafford, only if I am somehow compensated for my loss. (I note in passing that compensation could be very difficult. What kind of compensation would be adequate, for example, for someone who commits suicide out of love?). But the idea that the right to choose one’s partner depends on the ability to compensate disappointed suitors certainly seems moral. tyranny against those who choose. If every imposition of costs, regardless of their nature, raised the specter of moral tyranny, this would make the very prohibition of moral tyranny, inconsistently, an example of moral tyranny. This is one reason why the traditional libertarian position of a strict ban against some forms of cost imposition and a more permissive ban against others makes more sense.
It is also unclear whether it is really possible to maintain a clear line between personal ownership and ownership of external assets. Is a prosthetic limb part of a person’s body? If we say no, we view a disabled person’s property rights as having a narrower scope than those of nondisabled people. But if prosthetic limbs are indeed covered by self-ownership, despite being inorganic and detachable, it will be difficult to exclude external tools, and so on. It is not for nothing that thinkers as diverse as Aristotle, Locke, Kant and Hegel considered property as an extension of the self. And this is probably the libertarian basis for discriminating between cost impositions: those who physically interfere with the extended self will reasonably face a more severe ban than those who do not, and one certainly cannot legitimately suppress the latter by engaging in first.
However, this is an intelligently argued book that deserves careful reading and discussion, particularly among market libertarians, as it offers ingenious and powerful arguments, from premises that many libertarians will find appealing, to conclusions that most libertarians will be anxious to avoid. This is the kind of challenge that libertarians need to take seriously. And although, as I said, I don’t ultimately think Spafford’s case succeeds, my review has necessarily had to leave out all the details of his arguments, and is therefore not a complete response to them.
Please note that while the paper copy of this book has a high price tag, a PDF version is, appropriately for a manifesto against exclusive ownership, available for free on the Cambridge Core Open Access site.