From Judge Robert Payne’s opinion Friday in Sroufe v. [Scripps] Media Inc. (ED Va.) (allegedly defamatory story is here):
William D. Sroufe, a doctorate in education holder and former Superintendent of Colonial Heights Public Schools (“CHPS”) filed this action alleging a defamation claim against “Scripps t/a WTVR and/or CBS6.” … [He alleges that]on February 17, 2023, WTVR aired a news story about Sroufe’s departure as CHPS superintendent[, which] …was materially false because it reported that Sroufe had been “ousted” when, in fact, he was not and because: (1) it falsely implied that Sroufe had concealed reports of improper conduct by the softball coach at Colonial Heights High School which allowed the coach to escape criminal prosecution; and (2) the story falsely suggested that Sroufe was fired for concealing those complaints.
It is further alleged that WTVR, through its reporter, Melissa Hipolit, knew that the alleged misrepresentations were false and in fact knew that Sroufe had not been “ousted” but had voluntarily resigned from his position. Furthermore, … Hipolit [allegedly] knew that: (1) the sole source of the false narrative that Hipolit had so enthusiastically propagated had, in fact, told Hipolit a material falsehood about the story; and (2) the school board’s attorney had actually not only denied any cover-up, but had also provided Hipolit with evidence that negated the claims made by Hipolit’s indicted source.
The judge allowed the case to move forward, arguing, among other things, that the “ouster” claim was fact, not opinion, and was potentially defamatory:
Clearly, the simple meaning of the word “ouster” is negative and connotes an event other than voluntary. And, when the “expulsion” is linked to a report of termination of employment, well-established Virginia law permits a reasonable jury to find that the statement could reasonably be construed as a report that the termination of employment of Sroufe was involuntary, forced and against her will [and, in this story, based on alleged misconduct -EV]. Indeed, considering the context of its use in this case, it may be difficult for a jury to reach any other conclusion….
And the judge concluded that Sroufe was adequate to the alleged “actual malice,” i.e. knowing or reckless deceit on the part of the defendant:
As the US Supreme Court said San Amant v. Thompson (1968), actual malice may be found if there is “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows a reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.” .” The COMPLAINT alleges that defendant was aware that the entire story was based on a highly unreliable source known to have made materially false statements on the subject. It further alleges that, with such knowledge, defendant would have repeatedly published the statements of this source regarding the alleged cover-up “with a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity”.
In this regard, it is argued that, at the time of the news of February 17, Hipolit: (a) knew that [Alicia] Allen [Hipolit’s source, a former assistant coach -EV] he had lied to her about a material matter regarding the softball coach’s investigation; (b) she knew that Sroufe and the school system had not only denied the cover-up allegations, but had provided an objective factual basis for the denial; and (c) she possessed a Virginia State Police interview report that cast doubt on the source’s claims that she had previously reported specific misconduct complaints against the coach to the school system. Furthermore, the COMPLAINT alleges (and provides documentary support for the allegations via FOIA requests and third-party emails) that Hipolit had a preconceived narrative about Sroufe and the role he intended to promote, regardless of what the actual facts were. These statements, if proven, are sufficient to establish the element of malice.
Defendant claims, as a defense of actual malice, that he published Sroufe’s claims of innocence and his denials. Although, if proven, the alleged facts could be put to a jury as evidence of the absence of actual malice. However, stating such facts in a motion to dismiss is not sufficient to demonstrate the absence of malice as a matter of law.
Richard F. Hawkins, III (Hawkins Law Firm PC) represents the plaintiff.